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All rights reserved.An Analysis of the Welfare Eects of Parallel Trade Freedom
Abstract
In a double marginalization model which is played between a domestic mo-
nopolistic manufacturer of pharmaceuticals and a foreign exclusive distributor,
I examine the impact of parallel trade freedom on the manufacturer's prot. I
also analyze its impact on global welfare for low, intermediate, and high trade
costs and dierent levels of heterogeneity of the two countries where the manu-
facturer and the distributor are located.
The model suggests that parallel trade { provided that it is a credible threat {
reduces the prot of the manufacturer and thus reduces his incentives to invest
in R&D. If, however, trade costs are high, parallel trade is a non-credible threat
as it is not a worthwhile business activity for the foreign distributor and thus
does not have any impact on the prot of the manufacturer.
The model shows that parallel trade has positive welfare properties if the two
countries are suciently heterogeneous in terms of market size and if trade costs
are intermediate and low, respectively. If, however, the countries are virtually
homogenous in terms of market size, parallel trade may be detrimental to global










In  a  double  marginalization  model  which  is  played  between  a  domestic  monopolistic 
manufacturer of pharmaceuticals and a foreign exclusive distributor, I examine the impact of 
parallel trade freedom on the manufacturer’s profit. I also analyze its impact on global welfare 
for low, intermediate, and high trade costs and different levels of heterogeneity of the two 
countries where the manufacturer and the distributor are located. 
The model suggests that parallel trade – provided that it is a credible threat – reduces the 
profit of the manufacturer and thus reduces his incentives to invest in R&D. If, however, trade 
costs are high, parallel trade is a non-credible threat as it is not a worthwhile business activity 
for  the  foreign  distributor  and  thus  does  not  have  any  impact  on  the  profit  of  the 
manufacturer. 
The model shows that parallel trade has positive welfare properties if the two countries are 
sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of market size and if trade costs are intermediate and low, 
respectively. If, however, the countries are virtually homogenous in terms of market size, 
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1.   Introduction 
Parallel  imports  are  also  known  as  gray-market  imports.
1  More  specifically,  a  parallel-
imported product is a legitimately manufactured product under intellectual property protection 
that is first placed into circulation in one country. Then, the product is imported to a second 
country without the consent of the owner of the intellectual property rights (henceforth, IPRs) 
that are attached to the product in the second country.
2 For instance, parallel imports occur 
when  a  trading  firm  buys  quantities  of  a  particular  drug  in  a  low-price  country  such  as 
Portugal  and  then  imports  them  into  a  high-price  country  such  as  Germany  without  the 
approval of the exclusive distributor that owns the licensed patent rights in Germany.
3 
The ability of an owner of IPRs to exclude parallel trade stems from the importing country’s 
treatment of exhaustion of IPRs.
4 
On the one hand, under a regime of national exhaustion IPRs end upon first sale within a 
country,  and  right-holders  are  awarded  the  right  to  prevent  parallel  imports  from  other 
countries.
5 Hence, right owners retain full rights for distributing their goods either themselves 
or through authorized dealers; this also includes the right to exclude imports.
6 
On the other hand, a regime of international exhaustion of IPRs makes parallel imports from 
other  countries  legal,  as  “rights  are  exhausted  upon  first  sale  anywhere”.
7  Countries 
permitting parallel imports do not provide rightful owners with full rights for distributing their 
goods  themselves,  effectively  invalidating  any  right  to  control  the  import  of  goods  in 
circulation abroad. 
The regulation of parallel imports in the field of pharmaceuticals has become a critical issue 
in the global trading system, as the welfare effects of parallel imports of pharmaceuticals are 
generally ambiguous.
8 The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate 
about the welfare effects of parallel trade. 
In particular, there is tension between two major objectives of public policy. 
                                                 
1 See Müller-Langer (2007) for an extensive overview of the prior theoretic literature on the determinants of 
parallel trade. See also Maskus (2000) on p. 208 and Maskus (2001) on p. 2. 
2 See Maskus (2000) on p. 208. 
3 For instance, see Chard and Mellor (1989) and Danzon (1998). See also Maskus (2001) on p. 1. 
4 See Müller-Langer (2007) for an extensive overview of the legal framework regarding parallel trade. 
5 See Maskus (2001) on p. 3. See also Hilty (2000) and Maskus (2000) on pp. 208. 
6 See Maskus (2000) on pp. 208. 
7 See Maskus (2001) on p. 3. 
8 See Maskus and Chen (2004) and Danzon and Towes (2003). See also Maskus (2001) and Ganslandt and 
Maskus (2004) on pp. 1036. 
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On the one hand, a major long-run public policy objective is to stimulate the innovation and 
development of new medicines by awarding pharmaceutical producers with a patent on new 
medicines.
9 In particular, pharmaceutical producers shall benefit from the higher prices of 
medicines protected by a patent, in order to be able to cover high R&D costs. 
On  the  other  hand,  public  policy  should  also  ensure  broad  access  to  affordable  existing 
medicines  in  the  short-run.
10  Hence  there  is  a  trade-off  between  access  to  affordable 
medicines in the short-run and higher (monopoly) drug prices to stimulate R&D in the long-
run.
11 
The research-intensive pharmaceutical sector relies heavily on patents, as Mansfield (1986) 
has shown.
12 In particular, the value of a patent depends on the monopoly power afforded in 
terms of “scope for price differentiation”,
13 which depends on the existence of barriers to 
parallel trade. Put differently, the value of patent rights depends, to a certain extent, on “the 
scope for price discrimination within the area of exhaustion.”
14 Furthermore, the narrower the 
area of exhaustion the greater is the scope for price differentiation, and thus the higher is 
ceteris paribus the value of a patent. Consequently, advocates of strong patent rights for new 
pharmaceutical products support a global policy of banning parallel imports.
15 For instance, 
representatives  of  the  pharmaceutical  industry  argue  that  if  parallel  importation  of 
pharmaceuticals were permitted it would cut profits in the pharmaceutical industry, and thus 
would reduce the incentives to invest in R&D for new drugs.
16 
Nevertheless, policy makers in many developing countries not endowed with the technical 
and non-technical input factors required for innovation support an open regime of parallel 
imports.
17 In particular, they place a larger emphasis on the affordability of pharmaceuticals 
than  on  promoting  R&D  abroad,  arguing  that  it  is  important  to  be  able  to  purchase 
pharmaceuticals from the cheapest sources possible.
18 
The remainder of this paper – being a follow-up paper of Müller-Langer (2007) – is organized 
as follows. In Chapter 2, I develop a simple double marginalization model with complete 
                                                 
9 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1036. 
10 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1036. 
11 See Maskus (2001) on p. 23. 
12 For instance, Mansfield (1986) in a ranking of industries’ reliance on patent protection for innovation showed 
that  the  pharmaceutical  sector  is  more  than  twice  as  dependent  on  patent  protection  as  the  next  sector 
(chemicals). See also Harhoff (2005) on p. 4, Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) on p. 457, Harhoff et al. (2003), Bale 
(1998), Zweifel and Breyer (1997), and OECD (2000). 
13 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1036. 
14 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1037. 
15 For instance, see Barfield and Groombridge (1998). See also Bale (1998). 
16 See also Danzon (1998). 
17 See Maskus (2000) on p. 211. 
18 See Maskus (2001) on p. 2. 
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information  which  is  played  between  a  domestic  monopolistic  manufacturer  of 
pharmaceuticals and a foreign exclusive distributor. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the 
impact of parallel trade freedom on the manufacturer’s profit, consumer surplus and national 
welfare. In Chapter 4, I analyze the net effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare for 
low,  intermediate,  and  high  trade  costs  and  different  levels  of  heterogeneity  of  the  two 
countries where the manufacturer and the distributor are located. The paper concludes with 
some ideas for further research. 
 
2.  Double Marginalization Game with Complete Information 
2.1.  The Model 
Player  One  is  a  monopolistic  manufacturing  pharmaceutical  firm  located  in  country  A, 
henceforth  m.  Player  Two  is  a  single  authorized  independent  firm  located  in  country  B, 
henceforth r, and is responsible for the distribution and retail of the manufacturer’s product. 
The manufacturer holds a patent on the pharmaceutical product in both countries. We assume 
that  efficient  international  distribution  of  the  pharmaceutical  product  requires  the 
manufacturer to build a market in country B through exclusive territorial dealership rights.
19 
For instance, suppose that the exclusive distributor in country B has already established costly 
distribution channels.
20 Furthermore, we assume that the two countries differ in per capita 
income and in price elasticity of demand for a new medicine. 
The strategies available to the manufacturer and the distributor are the different prices they 
might charge. We will assume that negative prices are not feasible, but that any non-negative 
price can be charged.
21 Moreover, we assume that the payoff functions for the manufacturer 
and the distributor are simply their profit. 
Consider a model with two countries A and B. Demand for a specific pharmaceutical product 
in country A is 
        A A A D ( p ) a bp γ = −             (1) 
                                                 
19 See Maskus and Chen (2002) and Maskus and Chen (2004) who originally formulated the theory of parallel 
imports in the context of vertical price controls. 
20 See also Maskus (2000) on p. 213 and Gallini and Hollis (1999) on p. 2. 
21 For instance, assume that disposal costs are equal to zero. 
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with  1 γ > . pA denotes the price in country A. For simplicity, we assume that marginal costs of 
production c are equal to zero in both countries.
22 Demand for the pharmaceutical product in 
the low-income country B is  
        B B B D ( p ) a bp = − .            (2) 
γ  is a measure for the homogeneity of the two  countries.  If  γ  tends towards 1 the two 
countries are virtually homogenous. Put differently, the higher is γ  the more heterogeneous 
are the two countries. 
As  1 γ >  we can see from (1) and (2) that the price elasticity of demand
23 in country A, E
A(p), 
is lower than the price elasticity of demand in country B, E
B(p), for any given price p as  
       
A B bp bp
E ( p) E ( p)
a bp a bp γ
= < =
− −
.      (3) 
Thus, standard economic theory tells us that, in the absence of parallel imports, the single 
manufacturer engages in third-degree price discrimination and sets a price in country A that 
exceeds the price in country B. Put differently, the larger is the size of the market in country A 
and  the  more  inelastic  is  the  demand  in  country  A,  the  higher  is  the  price  in  country  A. 
However,  consumers  in  the  smaller  country  B  where  demand  is  elastic  receive  the 
pharmaceutical product at a lower price.
24 
We assume that there is an exclusive distributor in country B that is officially approved by the 
authorities in country A for re-importing the quantities of the pharmaceutical product he can 
buy from the monopolistic manufacturing firm in country A. Hence the distributor sells to 
consumers in country B at first, but may also engage in parallel trade from country B to 
country A. We also assume that arbitrage by individual consumers between B and A is legally 
prohibited.
25 The marginal costs of engaging in parallel trade are denoted by t. The costs of 
parallel trade include distribution cost as well as advertising cost. For instance, the costs of re-
packaging and re-labelling are incurred by the parallel-importing distributor as well as other 
parallel trade-specific transaction costs such as import duties on parallel trade.
26 Furthermore, 
                                                 
22 This is a common assumption in models that deal with the strategic decisions of pharmaceutical companies, as 
the marginal cost of production are negligibly small compared to the cost of research and development. For 
instance, see Ganslandt and Maskus (2001) on p. 6. 
23 See Schäfer and Ott (2004) on pp. 71 for a definition of the price elasticity of demand. 
24 See Tirole (1988) on p. 137. 
25 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1041. 
26 See NERA et al. (1999) on pp. 15. See also Maskus and Chen (2004) on p. 566, Li and Maskus (2006) on p. 
447, and Arfwedson (2004) on p. 8. 
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we assume that the parallel import product is a perfect substitute for the product sold by the 
original pharmaceutical producer in country A.
27 
Before we proceed to the analysis of the double marginalization game in which the exclusive 
distributor in country B may engage in parallel trade we will first analyze the case that the 
manufacturer of the patented product is awarded the right to prevent parallel imports as a 
benchmark. 
2.1.1.  Double Marginalization Game without Parallel Imports 
Suppose that the manufacturer can itself become involved in the retail of the pharmaceutical 
product in country A, but sells the product in country B through an exclusive distributor. 
Furthermore, we assume that the distributor in country B has a monopoly on the retailing 
business in country B. We make the simplifying assumption that retailing in country B does 
not involve any cost, except for the cost incurred by the distributor in buying the units of the 
pharmaceutical product from the manufacturing firm. Demand for the pharmaceutical product 
at the retail level is given by the demand curve B B B D ( p ) a bp = − , where  B p  is the retail price 
in country B. 
In the first stage, the manufacturing firm sets a wholesale price 
w
B p  for the distributor, and the 
distributor sets a price  B p  for the retail trade in country B in the second stage.
28 We will first 
assume  that  the  manufacturer  is  awarded  the  right  to  prevent  parallel  imports  of  the 
pharmaceutical product from country B, i.e. he is awarded an explicit right of importation of 
the pharmaceutical product.
29 Arbitrage by individual consumers between the two countries is 
legally prohibited.
30 The distributor is quoted a wholesale price 
w
B p , which he must pay per 
unit at wholesale. 
Using backward induction we start with the second stage. In the second stage, the distributor 
chooses which retail price  B p  he will charge his customers in country B.  
The distributor, facing wholesale price 
w
B p , will treat 
w
B p  as his marginal cost and will set  B p  
in order to maximize his profit  B ( p ) π .
31 Thus 
        ( )
B
w
B B B B p max p p D ( p ) − .          (4) 
                                                 
27 See also Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1041. 
28 See Spengler (1950). 
29 For instance, see Arfwedson (2004) on p. 4. 
30 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1044. 
31 Note that the manufacturer’s profit is denoted by Π  and the distributor’s profit by π , respectively. 
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By inserting (2) into (4) and differentiating (4) we obtain 









= .             (5) 
Furthermore, this gives 










= π .           (6) 
In the first stage, the manufacturing firm sets the wholesale price at 
w
B p , anticipating that the 
distributor will purchase ( ) 2
w
B a bp / − .
32 Hence the manufacturer’s profit generated in country 
B, 
w
B B ( p ) Π , will be 










Π .          (7) 
Differentiating (7) we obtain 







= .              (8) 
Inserting (8) into (5) and reformulating (5) we obtain 




B B p p = .              (9) 
We can see from (9) that the distributor marks up the price of the pharmaceutical product by 
50 percent, compared to the wholesale price 
w*
B p . Finally, by inserting (8) into (6) we obtain 
the equilibrium profit of the distributor 





π = .              (10) 
Inserting  (8)  into  (7)  we  obtain  the  equilibrium  profit  of  the  manufacturer  generated  in 
country B 






Π = .              (11) 
The manufacturing firm maximizes profits generated in country A according to  
       
A
A A p max( a bp )p γ − .
33            (12) 
By differentiating (12) we obtain the profit maximizing (monopoly) price as given by 








= .              (13) 
                                                 
32 To see that this is true insert (5) into (2) and reformulate (2). 
33 See also Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1042. 
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The profit generated in country A is given by 
        ( )
2
4 A a b Π γ = .            (14) 
So  far,  we  have  assumed  that  the  manufacturer  is  awarded  the  right  to  prevent  parallel 
imports. In the following section, we relax this assumption and allow for parallel imports, in 
order to explore the important strategic decision faced by the manufacturer as to at which 
wholesale price the pharmaceutical product is sold to the distributor in country B, anticipating 
that part of the quantities sold can be re-imported. 
2.1.2.  Double Marginalization Game with Parallel Imports 
Suppose that the manufacturer cannot contractually limit or even prohibit parallel trade.
34 The 
timing of the game is as follows: 
In the first stage, the manufacturing firm chooses the wholesale price 
w
B p ,  0
w
B p , ∈[ ∞), at 
which he sells the pharmaceutical product to the distributor in country B. 
In the second stage, the distributor chooses the retail price  B p , 0 B p , ∈[ ∞), in country B. 
In the third stage, the manufacturer m and the exclusive distributor r simultaneously choose 
the price at which they sell the product in country A in a Bertrand model of duopoly, e.g. 
m
A p , 
0
m
A p , ∈[ ∞), and 
r
A p ,  0
r
A p , ∈[ ∞), respectively. We solve the game starting with the last stage 
and working backwards to the first stage, in order to look for the sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium. 
2.1.2.1.  Backward Induction 
We start with the last stage where the manufacturer and the distributor play a Bertrand game
35 
and simultaneously choose prices for the pharmaceutical product in country A.
36 In looking 
for the Bertrand equilibrium this section will demonstrate different scenarios in terms of the 
prices the manufacturer and the distributor are charging, as well as in terms of the demand 
they are serving in country A. Prices and demand served must be consistent with the following 
rules: if the manufacturer and the distributor charge unequal prices, the low-price firm serves 
the entire market at the low price. Furthermore, the high-price firm gets no sales. However, if 
                                                 
34 See Joined cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure e.V. and Commission of 
the  European  Communities  vs.  Bayer  AG.  See  also  case  C-277/87  Sandoz  prodotti  farmaceutici  SpA  vs. 
Commission of the European Communities. 
35  See  Müller-Langer  (2007),  footnote  60,  with  respect  to  the  advantages  of  Bertrand’s  approach  over  the 
Cournot setup in a model that deals with pricing decisions in the pharmaceutical sector. 
36 See Bertrand (1883). See also Feess (2000) on pp. 411. 
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the manufacturer and the distributor charge the same price, total market demand is equally 
divided  between  them.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  quantity  consumers  demand  from  the 
manufacturer m is 










a bp    if p <p   
a bp
q   if p =p   





−  = 

 
          (15) 
Similarly, the quantity that consumers demand from the distributor r is given by 










a bp    if p <p   
a bp
q   if p =p   





−  = 

 
          (16) 
By  assumption  the  manufacturer  has  fixed  cost  of  zero  and  marginal  cost  of  zero. 
Furthermore,  we  assume  that  the  distributor  also  has  fixed  cost  of  zero.  However,  by 
assumption, the distributor treats the sum of the wholesale price 
w
B p  and the per unit cost of 
engaging  in  parallel  trade  t  as  his  marginal  cost  of  selling  the  pharmaceutical  product  in 
country A in the third stage. 
First, note that a firm would never charge a price that is lower than its marginal cost. In this 
case, the firm could increase its profits by simply reducing the quantities produced. On the 
one hand, the manufacturer could supply a positive quantity of the product as long as the price 
is non-negative, as his marginal costs are zero. On the other hand, the distributor would not 
charge a price smaller than his marginal cost 
w
B p t + . Hence, the manufacturer can monopolize 
the market in country A and steal all of the customers from the parallel importing distributor 
by setting a price that is infinitesimally smaller than the marginal cost of the distributor. Put 
differently,  the  manufacturer  will  always  set  the  price 
m w
A B p p t < + .  Consequently,  the 
distributor will not stay in the market in country A and will not engage in parallel trade. At 
this  point  we  can  already  formulate  the  first  result  of  the  analysis  of  the  double 
marginalization game with complete information. 
 
Proposition 1 : Parallel imports will never occur in any sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in 
a double marginalization game with complete information and Bertrand price competition in 
the last stage. 
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Note that this result holds for any non-negative 
w
B p  and any positive t. 
In the second stage, the distributor anticipates that he will be driven out of the market in 
country A in the third stage. Hence the maximization problem of the distributor is identical to 
the maximization problem we have already discussed before [see (4)–(6)]. For instance, the 
distributor will choose a price  2
w
B B p (a bp )/ b = + . 
Working backwards to the first stage, the maximization problem of the manufacturer is to 
maximize the total profit generated in country A and country B, subject to the constraint stated 
in 
m w
A B p p t ≤ +
37 and subject to the non-negativity restrictions stated in  0
m
A p ≥  and  0
w
B p ≥ . 
Mathematically, what the constraint and the non-negativity restrictions do is to narrow the 
range of the profit function. After the constraints are added we can admit only those values of 
m
A p   and 
w
B p   which  satisfy  the  constraints.  Note  that  we  have  to  adopt  the  Kuhn-Tucker 
Method to find a maximum, as we are dealing with an optimization problem with inequality 
constraints.  In  fact,  the  Kuhn-Tucker  Method  is  just  a  generalization  of  the  Lagrange-
Multiplier  Method  for  optimization  problems  with  inequality  constraints.
38  Adopting  the 
Kuhn-Tucker Method, we first have to identify the maximization problem. Secondly, we will 
define the Lagrange function by multiplying each constraint with the corresponding Lagrange 
multiplier and by adding it to the original profit function. And thirdly, we will derive the first-
order conditions that a solution for the maximization problem must satisfy. 
First, the maximization problem has the following format: 
        ( )
w
m w m m w B
A B A A B
a-bp




= −  
 
 
       
subject to       0
and                0













          (17) 
Second, let us write the classical type of the Lagrangian function, L, as follows 
      ( ) ( ) 1 2 3 1 2 3
w
m w m m w m w w m B
A B A A B A B B A
a-bp
L( p ,p ; , , ) a bp p  +p p p t p p
2
λ λ λ γ λ λ λ
 
= − + + + + −  
 
. (18) 
Third, we obtain the following first-order conditions: 









= − + − =
∂
        (19) 
                                                 
37Note that the manufacturer always sets a price in country A that undercuts the distributor’s marginal costs. The 
manufacturer undercuts the distributor’s marginal cost at least by an infinitely small ε . 
38 See Kuhn and Tucker (1951). See also Chiang (1984) on pp. 722 and Eichberger (2004) on pp. 402. 
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= − + + =
∂
         (20) 
        1 0
m
A p , λ =               (21) 
        2 0
w
B p , λ =               (22) 
        ( ) 3 0
w m
B A t p p . λ + − =             (23) 
        0 0
m w
A B p ,p , ≥ ≥             (24) 
        0
w m
B A t p p . + − ≥             (25) 
        1 2 3 0 0 0 , , . ≥ ≥ ≥ λ λ λ             (26) 
We must now find solutions ( ) 1 2 3
m w
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ  that can satisfy all conditions given by (19)–
(26). Therefore it is appropriate to discuss various cases that differ as to the extent to which 
the constraints are binding. For instance, if  1 0 λ > , it follows from (21) that  0
m
A p = . To give 
another example, if  0
m
A p > , it follows from (21) that  1 0 λ = .
39 As we have three Lagrange 
multipliers  1 2 , λ λ  and  3 λ  that are either positive or equal to zero, we have to distinguish 
between nine different cases. 
After checking each of the nine cases with regard to the question as to whether it satisfies all 
conditions  given  by  (19)–(26)  we  obtain  two  solutions:  ( ) 1 2 3
m* w* * * *
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ   and 
( ) 1 2 3
m** w** ** ** **
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ . The first solution is given by: 








































  = + +  
 
  = + −  
 
=  
  =  
 
= − −  
 
 
          (27) 
We  can  see  from  (27)  that  the  optimal  price  the  manufacturer  sets  in  country  A  always 
exceeds the optimal wholesale price the manufacturer charges the distributor in country B as 
0 t > . More specifically, the difference between 
m*
A p  and 
w*
B p  is equal to t. Furthermore, we 
can  see  from  (27)  that  the  optimal  wholesale  price  decreases  if  t  increases,  and  that  the 
                                                 
39 The conditions which imply that either the Lagrange multiplier is zero or a constraint binding are called 
complementary slackness conditions. See also Chiang (1984) on pp. 722. 
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optimal price the manufacturer sets in country A increases if t increases, respectively. Put 
differently, the higher the parallel trade  cost t for a  given  γ  and thus the less profitable 
parallel trade the higher is 
m*
A p  and the lower
w*
B p . 
However, we can also see from (27) that the non-negativity restriction for 3
* λ  is only satisfied 
for specific values of the parameter t. Therefore, let us now determine this threshold for t. 





t λ γ = − − ≥  





γ ⇔ ≤ − .            (28) 
Henceforth, we will refer to this threshold given by (28) as the upper bound for the trade cost, 
that is  ( ) 1 2 t a / b
−
= − γ . 
To  conclude  the  discussion  with  respect  to  the  first  solution,  the  outcome 
( ) 1 2 3
m* w* * * *
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ  given by (27) only satisfies each of the eight conditions given by (19)-
(26) if  t t
−
≤ .
40 If, however,  t t
−
> , i.e. for high parallel trade cost and a relatively low  γ , 
( ) 1 2 3
m* w* * * *
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ  is not a solution for the maximization problem given by (17), due to the 
fact  that  the  non-negativity  restriction  for  3
* λ   would  not  be  satisfied.  Thus  we  have  to 
consider the second solution ( ) 1 2 3
m** w** ** ** **
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ  given by 




























  =  
 
  =  
 
=  





             (29) 
When we compare (29) with (13) and (8), we find that 
m**
A p  is equal to the monopoly price in 
a double marginalization game in which parallel imports are prohibited, and 
w**
B p  is equal to 
the profit-maximizing wholesale price in a double marginalization game in which parallel 
imports  are  prohibited,  respectively.  Intuitively,  if  the  two  countries  are  virtually 
                                                 
40 See Appendix 1 for the proof that for the non-negativity restriction for
w*
B p  to be satisfied it is sufficient that 
the non-negativity restriction for  3
* λ  is satisfied. 
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homogeneous ( 1 γ → ) and the parallel trade costs are so high that  t t
−
> , the distributor will 
not be willing to engage in parallel trade. Put differently, if t t
−
> , the outcome of the double 
marginalization game in which parallel imports are permitted is equal to the outcome of the 
double  marginalization  game  in  which  the  manufacturer  is  awarded  the  right  to  prevent 
parallel imports. 
 
3.  Effects of Parallel Trade Freedom on Profits, Consumer Surplus 
and National Welfare 
3.1.  Equilibrium Prices and Quantities 
Table 1 provides a summary of the equilibrium prices and quantities in country A and country 
B when the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade and when parallel trade 
is permitted for low trade cost (denoted by subscript l), intermediate trade cost (denoted by 
subscript i) and high trade cost (denoted by subscript h). 
For instance, we obtain the equilibrium retail price under a regime of international exhaustion 
when parallel trade is allowed and intermediate trade cost denoted by 
*
( B,i ) p  by plugging the 
equilibrium wholesale price 
w*
( B,i ) p  into the reaction function of the distributor given by (5). 
Furthermore, we obtain the equilibrium quantities by plugging the relevant equilibrium prices 
into  the  relevant  demand  functions.  For  instance,  we  obtain  the  equilibrium  quantity  in 
country B under a regime of international exhaustion and intermediate trade cost denoted by 
*
( B,i ) q  by plugging 
*
( B,i ) p  into the demand function given by (2). 
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Table 1   Equilibrium Prices and Quantities 




  Scenario 1-3 
(high,  intermediate 
and low t) 
   
  Parallel  imports 
permitted 
Parallel imports permitted 















Equilibrium  price 
in country A  2
m** m*





















= + +  
Equilibrium 
























= − −  
Equilibrium 

















= + −  
Country  B  will  not 
be served 
Equilibrium  retail 

















= + −  
Country  B  will  not 
be served 
Equilibrium 




B ( B,h )
a








= − +  
Country  B  will  not 
be served 
 
In order to double-check that the results in Table 1 are correct, note that the equilibrium 
prices and quantities in country A and country B in both situations with and without parallel 
imports are identical if we set  ( ) 1 2 t t a / b
−
= = − γ  which we will call the upper bound for t. If 
trade costs exceed the upper bound, we will refer to them as high trade costs. Furthermore, we 
know from the analysis in the previous sections that the equilibrium prices and quantities for 
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high trade costs are the same in both cases when the manufacturer is awarded the right to 
prevent parallel imports and when parallel imports are permitted, i.e. 
w** w*
B ( B,h ) p p = . 
There is, however, also a lower bound for t under a regime of international exhaustion of IPRs 
with parallel trade as we will see in the following. 
The distributor will only be willing to sell the product in country B as long as he can sell a 
quantity of the product in country B that is equal to or greater than zero and as long as the 
retail  price  he  can  charge  is  equal  to  or  greater  than  the  wholesale  price  set  by  the 
manufacturer. Put differently, 
        0
*
( B,i ) q ≥  






γ   ⇔ ≥ −  
 
            (30) 
Alternatively, we can derive the participation constraint for the distributor as follows. 
       
* w*
( B,i ) ( B,i ) p p ≥  






γ   ⇔ ≥ −  
 
            (31) 
Henceforth, we will refer to this threshold given by (31) as the lower bound for the trade cost, 
that  is  ( ) 5 2 2 t a ( / ) / b
− = − γ .  Intuitively,  if  trade  costs  are  very  low,  i.e.  t t
−
< ,  potential 
competition from parallel trade is so fierce that the manufacturer has to charge such a high 
wholesale price in country B in order to deter parallel trade that the distribution of the good in 
country B becomes unprofitable. In this case, the market in country B will not be served. 
However, we can see from the previous analysis that we have to deal with three different 
scenarios. 
First, parallel trade costs are so high – more specifically  t t
−
>  – that parallel trade is not a 
worthwhile activity for the distributor and thus a non-credible threat. In other words, for very 
high trade costs, the equilibrium outcome will be the same no matter whether or not the 
manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade. More specifically, parallel trade 
does  not  have  any  impact  on  profits,  consumer  surplus,  and  welfare  in  both  countries. 
Consequently, parallel trade does not have any impact on global welfare if trade costs are very 
high. 
However, the analysis of the second scenario with trade costs at an intermediate level – more 
specifically  t t t
−
− ≤ ≤  – is not trivial. As we will see in the following, for intermediate trade 
costs, the manufacturer will strategically set prices in order to deter parallel trade under a 
15 Müller-Langer: An Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Parallel Trade Freedom
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regime of international exhaustion of IPRs. However, the wholesale price will be sufficiently 
low so that the distribution of the product in country B is still a worthwhile activity. 
In the third scenario with very low trade costs – more specifically  t t
−
<  – the manufacturer 
will charge such a high wholesale price in country B, in order to deter parallel trade under a 
regime of international exhaustion of IPRs that the market in country B ends up not being 
served. 
In the following sections, we will analyze the impact of parallel trade freedom on the profit of 
the manufacturer and on global welfare for intermediate and low trade costs, respectively. 
 
3.2.  Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on the Profit of the Manufacturer 
In the following sections, I will show that the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 2: The threat of parallel trade – under a regime of international exhaustion of 
IPRs – leads to lower profits of the manufacturer (i) if trade costs are intermediate and (ii) if 
trade costs are low, respectively. 
3.2.1.  Effect  of  Parallel  Trade  Freedom  on  the  Manufacturer’s  Profit  for  Intermediate 
Trade Costs 
At an intermediate level of t,  t t t
−
− ≤ ≤ , the equilibrium profit of the manufacturer if parallel 
trade is permitted is given by
41 
       
* * * m* * w* *
i ( A,i ) ( B,i ) ( A,i ) ( A,i ) ( B,i ) ( B,i ) p q p q Π = Π +Π = +  
       
2 2 2 2 2
24 3 3 6 3 6
*
i




⇔ Π = − − + + +     (32) 
However, at an intermediate level of t, the equilibrium profit of the manufacturer if he is 
awarded the right to prevent parallel trade is given by 
       
** ** ** ** m** ** w** **
i A B A A B B p q p q Π = Π = Π +Π = +  









⇔ Π = Π = +           (33) 
Note that 
** ** ** **
i l h Π = Π = Π = Π  as the profit of the manufacturer is always the same if he is 
awarded the right to prevent parallel trade. The question arises as to whether parallel trade – at 
                                                 
41 Recall that the manufacturer’s profit is denoted by Π and the distributor’s profit by π, respectively. 
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an intermediate level of t – has a positive or negative impact on the profit of the manufacturer. 
In  particular,  let  i ∆Π   denote  the  difference  between  the  equilibrium  profit  of  the 
manufacturer if parallel trade is permitted given by (32) and the equilibrium profit of the 
manufacturer if he has the right to prevent parallel trade given by (33). Hence, 
       
* **
i i i ∆Π = Π −Π  
       
2 2 2 2 2
12 3 3 6 3 12
i




⇔ ∆Π = − − − + + −     (34) 
Note that  i ∆Π  is a quadratic function of t which is an important feature we will elaborate 
upon in the following. It is straightforward to see that a negative  i ∆Π  would indicate that the 
manufacturer can generate a higher profit if he were awarded the right to prevent parallel 
trade. In other words, in order to show that, for intermediate trade costs, parallel trade harms 
the manufacturer it is sufficient to show that  i ∆Π  is negative. Intuitively,  0 i ∆Π =  if t t
−
=  as 
the equilibrium quantities and prices are identical in both situations with and without parallel 
trade. In order to see that this intuition is correct, set  ( ) 1 2 t t a / b
−
= = − γ  in (34). Furthermore, 
note that  i ∆Π  has its maximum at t t
−
=  as 




i a bt a
t
γ ∂∆Π
= − − + =
∂
 





γ ⇔ = −             (35) 
and 











            (36) 
as  0 b > . To summarize,  i ∆Π  is a quadratic function of t and has its unique maximum at  t
−
. 
Furthermore,  0 i ∆Π =  at  t
−
. Hence,  i ∆Π  is negative for any other value of the parameter t. 
Therefore, for intermediate trade costs, parallel trade freedom harms the manufacturer as it 
leads to a lower profit [Proposition 2(i)]. 
However, an important point in favor of banning parallel trade is the following. By the time 
the manufacturer chooses to invest in R&D for a new product, he will be more willing to do 
so, anticipating that he will be able to raise more money from the new product. In other 
words, under the assumption that the R&D investment leads with certainty to the development 
of a new product, the maximum amount that the manufacturer is willing to invest in R&D for 
17 Müller-Langer: An Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Parallel Trade Freedom
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the product is just the profit that he can generate.
42 As the profit of the manufacturer if he is 
awarded  the  right  to  prevent  parallel  trade  is  higher  than  his  profit  under  parallel  trade 
freedom, the incentive of the manufacturer to invest in R&D – for intermediate trade costs – 
is higher if he can prevent parallel trade.
43 
However, let us now turn to the question whether the same reasoning applies to the case with 
low trade costs in the following. 
3.2.2.  Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on the Manufacturer’s Profit for Low Trade Costs 
In this section, we consider the case of very low trade costs, t t
−
< . Recall that trade costs are 
assumed to be positive. Hence, we can see from  ( ) 5 2 2 t t a ( / ) / b
− < = − γ  that  γ  must be 
greater than 5/2 in this case. For smaller values of the parameter γ  we would automatically 
end up in one of the other two scenarios mentioned above. Intuitively, if γ  is very low, i.e. 
1 γ → , parallel trade may not be a highly attractive business activity for the distributor even if 
trade costs are very low. 
However, if trade costs are very low and  5 2 / γ > , the market in country B will end up not 
being served. Hence, the manufacturer will only generate a profit in country A if parallel trade 
is permitted. The profit is given by 
     
2 2 2 2 2 2
36 9 9 18 9 9
* m* *
l ( A,l ) ( A,l )
a at bt a at a
p q .
b b b
Π = = − − − + + +
γ γ γ
     (37) 
However, for low trade cost, the equilibrium profit of the manufacturer if he is awarded the 
right to prevent parallel trade is given by 









Π = Π = +           (38) 
The question arises as to whether the threat of parallel trade – for low trade cost – has a 
positive or negative impact on the profit of the manufacturer. In particular, let  l ∆Π  denote 
the difference between the equilibrium profit of the manufacturer if parallel trade is permitted 
and the equilibrium profit of the manufacturer if he has the right to prevent parallel trade. 
Hence, 
     
2 2 2 2 2 11
72 9 9 18 9 36
* **
l l l
a at bt a at a
.
b b b
∆Π = Π −Π = − − − + + −
γ γ γ
     (39) 
                                                 
42 See also Deardorff (1992) on p. 40. 
43 See also Valletti and Szymanski (2006) on p. 504. 
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We can see from (39) that  l ∆Π  is a quadratic function of t. Let us now find the maximum of 
l ∆Π . We obtain the maximum as follows 




l a bt a
t
γ ∂∆Π
= − − + =
∂
 





γ ⇔ = −             (40) 
and  











            (41) 
as  0 b > .  l ∆Π  has its unique maximum at  ( ) 1 2 t a / b
−
= − γ . Hence, in order to show that 
l ∆Π  is negative for  t t
−
<  it is sufficient to show that  l ∆Π  is negative at  t
−
. Therefore, by 
plugging  ( ) 1 2 t a / b
−
= − γ  into  l ∆Π  given by (39) we obtain 







∆Π = − <             (42) 
as  0 a >   and  0 b > .  From  (42),  it  follows  that,  for  low  trade  costs,  the  profit  of  the 
manufacturer – if he is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade – is higher than the profit of 
the manufacturer if parallel trade is permitted. Therefore, for low trade cost, parallel trade 
freedom harms the manufacturer as it leads to a lower profit [see Proposition 2 (ii)].
44 
Let us now summarize the results of the analysis of the impact of parallel trade freedom on 
the manufacturer’s profit for intermediate costs (scenario 2) and low trade costs (scenario 3). 
My model shows that parallel trade freedom harms the manufacturer in both scenarios as it 
reduces his profit [see Proposition 2].
45 Hence, if the unique social objective was to spur 
R&D for new pharmaceutical products by protecting the manufacturer who holds a patent on 
the  pharmaceutical  product  in  country  A  and  country  B,  my  model  suggested  that  the 
manufacturer should be awarded the right to prevent parallel trade. 
However, the protection of the manufacturer is clearly not the only social objective. Indeed, 
we have to take a closer look at the welfare effects of parallel trade freedom. Therefore, a 
central purpose of the following sections is to explore the question as to whether parallel trade 
should be permitted or prohibited from a global welfare perspective if trade costs are at an 
                                                 
44 See also Crampes et al. (2006) for an analysis of the threat of parallel trade and its impact on prices in the 
context of bundling, i.e. a firm bundles its main product which is a tradable good with a non-traded service. 
45 See also Scherer and Watal (2002) on pp. 38. 
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intermediate level and if trade costs are low. Note that permitting parallel trade does not have 
any impact on global welfare if trade costs are very high. 
However, in order to be able to calculate global welfare, we first have to derive the profit of 
the distributor, consumer surplus, as well as welfare in country A and country B if trade costs 
are intermediate and low, respectively. 
 
3.3.  Profit of the Distributor 
3.3.1.  Profit of the Distributor if Parallel Trade is Prohibited 
If the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade, the profit of the distributor is 
the same for high, intermediate and low trade costs and given by 
        ( )
2
16
** * ** w** **
h B B B
a
p p q .
b
= = − = π π         (43) 
Note that the profit of the distributor if parallel trade is permitted but trade costs are high, 
*
h π , 
is also given by (43). 
3.3.2.  Profit of the Distributor for Intermediate Trade Costs if Parallel Trade is Permitted 
As already mentioned above, for intermediate trade costs the market in country B will be 
served so that the distributor will make a profit according to 
                        
    ( )
2 2 2 2 2 25 5 5
144 18 9 36 9 36
* * w* *
i ( B,i ) ( B,i ) ( B,i )
a at bt a at a
p p q .
b b b
= − = + + − − +
γ γ γ
π   (44) 
By looking at (43) and (44) it becomes apparent that parallel trade freedom is detrimental to 
the distributor as  0
* **
i i ∆ = − < π π π .
46 The intuition behind this result is the following. If the 
threat of parallel trade is credible, the manufacturer will charge a higher wholesale price in 
country B – as compared to the wholesale price under a regime in which parallel trade is 
prohibited – in order to deter parallel trade. Consequently, the distributor will sell less at a 
higher price resulting in a lower profit under a regime of parallel trade freedom.  
                                                 
46  To  see  that  this  is  true  note  that  i ∆π   has  its  unique  maximum  at  the  lower  bound  for  t,  t
−
. 
Furthermore,  i ∆π  is negative at  t
−
 as  0
2 a / 36b − < . Consequently,  i ∆π  is also negative for any 
other value of the parameter t. 
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3.3.3.  Profit of the Distributor if Parallel Trade is Permitted and Trade Costs are Low 
Recall that neither the distribution of the good in country B nor parallel trade is a worthwhile 
business  activity  if  trade  costs  are  low  as  the  manufacturer  strategically  charges  a 
prohibitively high wholesale price in country B in order to deter parallel trade. Hence, we set 
the profit of the distributor for low trade costs equal to zero if parallel trade is permitted. 
 
3.4.  Consumer Surplus in Country A 
3.4.1.  Consumer Surplus in Country A if the Manufacturer has the Right to Prevent Parallel 
Trade 
In  general,  we  obtain  the  consumer  surplus  by  calculating  the  area  between  the  demand 
function and the market price. Taking into account that demand in country A is given by the 
linear function (1) and taking into account that  a / b γ  is the intercept of the demand function 
with the vertical (price) axis, we obtain the consumer surplus in country A if the manufacturer 
has the right to prevent parallel trade as follows. 
       
2 2 1
2 8
** * ** m**
A ( A,h ) A A
a a
CS CS q p .
b b
  = = − =  
 
γ γ
      (45) 
Note that the consumer surplus in country A, if parallel trade is permitted but trade costs are 
high, 
*
( A,h ) CS , is also given by (45). 
3.4.2.  Consumer Surplus in Country A for Intermediate Trade Costs if Parallel Trade is 
Permitted 
Analogue to the calculation in the previous section, the consumer surplus in country A for 
intermediate trade costs is given by 
                         
   
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
2 72 18 18 9 9 9
* m* *
( A,i ) ( A,i ) ( A,i )
a a at bt a at a
CS p q .
b b b b
  = − = + + − − +  
 
γ γ γ γ
   (46) 
3.4.3.  Consumer Surplus in Country A for Low Trade Costs if Parallel Trade is Permitted 
The consumer surplus in country A for low trade costs is given by 
       
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
72 18 18 9 9 9
*
( A,l )




= + + − − +     (47) 
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3.5.  Consumer Surplus in Country B 
3.5.1.  Consumer Surplus in Country B if the Manufacturer has the Right to Prevent Parallel 
Trade 
Taking into account that demand in country B is given by the linear function (2) and taking 
into account that  a / b  is the intercept of the demand function with the vertical (price) axis, 
we obtain the consumer surplus in country B if the manufacturer is awarded the right to 
prevent parallel trade as follows. 
       
2 1
2 32
** * ** **
B ( B,h ) B B
a a
CS CS p q .
b b
  = = − =  
 
      (48) 
Note that the consumer surplus in country B if parallel trade is permitted but trade costs are 
high, 
*
( B,h ) CS , is also given by (48). 
3.5.1.1.  Consumer Surplus in Country B with Intermediate Trade Costs if Parallel Trade is 
Permitted 
Analogue to the calculation in the previous section, the consumer surplus in country B for 
intermediate trade costs is given by 
     
 
2 2 2 2 2 1 25 5 5
2 288 36 18 72 18 72
* * *
( B,i ) ( B,i ) ( B,i )
a a at bt a at a
CS p q .
b b b b
  = − = + + − − +  
 
γ γ γ
    (49) 
3.5.1.2.  Consumer Surplus in Country B with Low Trade Costs if Parallel Trade is Permitted 
Recall that the distribution of the good in country B is not a worthwhile business activity if 
trade  costs  are  low  as  the  manufacturer  charges  a  prohibitively  high  wholesale  price  in 
country B in order to deter parallel trade. Hence, we set consumer surplus in country B equal 
to zero if parallel trade is permitted and trade costs are low. 
 
22 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2008,  Paper 9
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2008/iss1/art9Frank Müller-Langer       Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Parallel Trade Freedom  23 
3.6.  Welfare in Country A 
3.6.1.  Welfare in Country A if Parallel Trade is Prohibited 
Welfare in country A if the manufacturer has the right to prevent parallel trade is given by the 
sum of the total profit generated by the manufacturer given by (33) and the consumer surplus 
in country A given by (45). Hence,  
       
2 2 2 3
8 8
** * ** **
A ( A,h ) A
a a
W W CS .
b b
= = Π + = +
γ
      (50) 
Note that welfare in country A if parallel trade is permitted but trade costs are high, 
*
( A,h ) W , is 
also given by (50). 
3.6.2.  Welfare in Country A with Intermediate Trade Costs if Parallel Trade is Permitted 
Welfare in country A if parallel trade is permitted and trade costs are at an intermediate level 
is given by the sum of the profit of the manufacturer given by (32) and the consumer surplus 
in country A given by (46). Hence, 
     
2 2 2 2 2 5 5 7
18 18 18 18 9 18
* * *
( A,i ) i ( A,i )
a at bt a at a
W CS .
b b b
= Π + = − − + + +
γ γ γ
  (51) 
3.6.3.  Welfare in Country A with Low Trade Costs if Parallel Trade is Permitted 
Welfare in country A if parallel trade is permitted and trade costs are low is given by the sum 
of the profit of the manufacturer given by (37) and the consumer surplus given by (47) 
     
2 2 2 2 2 4
72 18 18 18 9 9
* * *
( A,l ) l ( A,l )
a at bt a at a
W CS .
b b b
= Π + = − − − − − +
γ γ γ
  (52) 
 
3.7.  Welfare in Country B 
3.7.1.  Welfare in Country B if Parallel Trade is Prohibited 
Welfare in country B if the manufacturer has the right to prevent parallel trade is given by the 
sum of the profit generated by the distributor given by (43) and the consumer surplus in 
country B given by (48) 
       
2 3
32
** * ** **
B ( B,h ) B
a
W W CS .
b
= = + = π         (53) 
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Note that welfare in country B if parallel trade is permitted but trade costs are high, 
*
( B,h ) W , is 
also given by (53). 
3.7.2.  Welfare in Country B with Intermediate Trade Costs if Parallel Trade is Permitted 
Welfare in country B – if parallel trade is permitted and trade costs are at an intermediate level 
– is given by the sum of the profit generated by the distributor given by (44) and the consumer 
surplus in country B given by (49) 
     
2 2 2 2 2 25 5 5
96 12 6 24 6 24
* * *
( B,i ) i ( B,i )
a at bt a at a
W CS .
b b b
= + = + + − − +
γ γ γ
π   (54) 
3.7.3.  Welfare in Country B with Low Trade Costs if Parallel Trade is Permitted 
Welfare in country B is equal to zero if trade costs are low,  ( ) 5 2 2 t a ( / ) / b t
− = − > γ . Note 
that  we  end  up  in  this  situation  only  for  relatively  high  values  of  the  parameterγ ,  more 
specifically if  5 2 / γ >  as t is assumed to be positive. 
 
4.  Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on Global Welfare 
4.1.  Global Welfare 
4.1.1.  Global Welfare if Parallel Trade is Prohibited 
If the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade, global welfare is given by 
the sum of welfare in country A given by (50) and welfare in country B given by (53). More 
specifically, 
       
2 2 2 7 3
32 8
** * ** **
h A B
a a
W W W W .
b b
= = + = +
γ       (55) 
Note that global welfare, if parallel trade is permitted but trade costs are high, 
*
h W , is also 
given by (55). 
 
4.1.2.  Global Welfare if Parallel Trade is Permitted and Trade Costs are Intermediate 
By adding welfare in country A given by (51) and welfare in country B given by (54) we 
obtain global welfare if trade costs are at an intermediate level and parallel trade is permitted: 
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2 2 2 2 2 91 5 11 31
288 36 9 72 18 72
* * *
i ( A,i ) ( B,i )
a at bt a at a
W W W .
b b b
= + = + − − − +
γ γ γ   (56) 
 
4.1.3.  Global Welfare if Parallel Trade is Permitted and Trade Costs are Low 
We  already  know  from  the  previous  analysis  that  in  this  case  the  distribution  of  the 
pharmaceutical product in country B is not a worthwhile business activity. Put differently, the 
profit of the distributor, consumer surplus as well as welfare in country B are equal to zero if 
parallel trade is permitted and trade costs are low. Consequently, global welfare is equal to 
welfare in country A. More specifically, welfare in country A and thus global welfare in this 
case is given by (52): 
     
2 2 2 2 2 4
72 18 18 18 9 9
* *
l ( A,l )




= = − − − − − +
47    (57) 
In the following sections, I analyze the impact of parallel trade freedom on global welfare for 
three different scenarios. More specifically, for the cases of high, intermediate, and low trade 
costs, we derive the net effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare by subtracting 
global welfare if the manufacturer has the right to prevent parallel trade from global welfare if 
parallel trade is permitted. 
The  intuition  behind  this  is  the  following.  If  this  difference  is  negative,  parallel  trade  is 
detrimental  to  global  welfare  and  thus  the  manufacturer  should  be  awarded  the  right  to 
prevent parallel trade. If, however, this difference is positive, it would indicate that global 
welfare is higher if parallel trade is permitted. 
 
4.2.  Net Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on Global Welfare if Trade Costs are High 
We already know from the analysis in the previous sections that the outcome of the double 
marginalization game if parallel trade is permitted is equal to the outcome of the double 
marginalization game without parallel trade if trade costs are high,  t t
−
> . Consequently, the 
profits of the manufacturer and the distributor, consumer surplus as well as welfare in country 
A and country B are equal, regardless of whether parallel trade is prohibited or permitted. 
Therefore, even if parallel trade were permitted, the (non-credible) threat of parallel trade 
                                                 
47 See also Appendix 2 for a summary of the results of my analysis. 
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would  not  have  any  impact  on  global  welfare  because  parallel  trade  is  not  a  worthwhile 
business activity for the distributor due to prohibitively high trade costs. 
However, let us now analyze the other two cases with intermediate and low trade costs in 
which potential competition from parallel trade may arise as parallel trade is a worthwhile 
business activity for the exclusive distributor. 
 
4.3.  Net Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on Global Welfare if Trade Costs are at an 
Intermediate Level 
4.3.1.  Net  Effect  of  Parallel  Trade  Freedom  on  Global  Welfare  for  Intermediate  Trade 
Costs and  5 2 / γ ≥  
In this section, I will show that the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 3: Parallel trade freedom increases global welfare if trade costs are intermediate 
and  5 2 / γ ≥ . 
 
Let the net effect of parallel trade on global welfare be denoted by  i W ∆  if trade costs are at an 
intermediate level,  t t t
−
− ≤ ≤ . In particular, we obtain  i W ∆  by subtracting global welfare if 
parallel trade is prohibited given by (55) from global welfare if parallel trade is permitted and 
trade costs are at an intermediate level given by (56) 
     
2 2 2 2 2 7 5 11
72 36 9 72 18 18
* **
i i
a at bt a at a
W W W .
b b b
∆ = − = + − − − +
γ γ γ     (58) 
Note that  i W ∆  is a quadratic function of t. The question arises as to whether (58) is positive or 
negative. If (58) is positive, parallel trade freedom has a positive effect on global welfare. If, 
however, (58) is negative, parallel trade freedom is detrimental to global welfare. First, note 
that  0 i W ∆ =  at  ( ) 1 2 t a / b γ = − : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 2 2 2 5 1 2 1 2 1 2 7 11
0
72 36 9 72 18 18
i




∆ = + − − − + =
γ γ γ γ γ γ
(59) 
In other words,  i W ∆  is equal to zero at the upper bound for t. Hence, in order to show that 
i W ∆  and thus the effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare is positive it is sufficient 
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to show that  i W ∆  is a monotonically decreasing function of t for t t t
−
− ≤ ≤ . Let us first find out 
whether  i W ∆  has a unique maximum by differentiating (58) with respect to t. 




i W a bt a
t
γ ∂∆
= − − =
∂
 








γ   ⇔ = −  
 
            (60) 
Note that 
max
i t  is the unique maximum as 
2 2 2 9 0 i W t b / ∂ ∆ ∂ = − <  as  0 b > . As 
max
i t  is the 
unique  maximum,  i W ∆   decreases  in  t  for  any 
max
i t t > .  In  other  words,  if 
( ) 5 4 2 2 t a ( / ) ( / ) / b γ > − ,  i W ∆   decreases  in  t.  Furthermore,  taking  into  account  that 
0 i W ∆ =  at  ( ) 1 2 t a / b γ = − , it follows that  0 i W ∆ >  for  ( ) 5 4 2 2 t a ( / ) ( / ) / b γ > − . In the 
following, we show for which values of the parameter γ  
max




       
5 5






    = − ≤ −    
   
γ
γ  
       
5
2
γ ⇔ ≥ .              (61) 
In other words, for  5 2 / γ ≥  the unique maximum of  i W ∆  is located on the left-hand side of 
the lower bound for t. Furthermore,  i W ∆  monotonically decreases in t on the interval between 
the lower bound and the upper bound for t. Hence, taking into account that  0 i W ∆ =  at the 
upper bound for t,  i W ∆  and thus the impact of parallel trade on global welfare is positive if 
5 2 / γ ≥  as stated in Proposition 3. 
4.3.2.  Net Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom if Trade Costs are at an Intermediate Level and 
5 2 / γ <  
If  5 2 / γ < , we cannot apply the same logic as in the previous section in order to answer the 
question as to whether  i W ∆  is positive or negative. Note that – for  5 2 / γ <  – the lower 
bound  ( ) 5 2 2 t a ( / ) / b
− = − γ  would be negative. However, as t is assumed to be positive we 
set the lower bound for t equal to zero in this case. Furthermore, note that also for  5 2 / γ < , 
i W ∆  has its unique maximum at  ( ) 5 4 2 2
max
i t a ( / ) ( / ) / b = − γ  [(60)] which is positive as 
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5 2 / γ < . Hence, the question arises as to whether  i W ∆  is positive or negative at the lower 
bound for t. For instance, if we can show that  i W ∆  is positive at  0 t =  this would imply that 
i W ∆  is also positive between the lower bound and the upper bound taking into account that 
0 i W ∆ =  at the upper bound for t. In the following we will show that  i W ∆  is positive at  0 t =  
if 7 4 5 2 / / γ ≤ < . 
4.3.3.  Net  Effect  of  Parallel  Trade  Freedom  on  Global  Welfare  for  Intermediate  Trade 
Costs and 7 4 5 2 / / γ ≤ <  
In this section, I will show that the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition  4:  Parallel  trade  freedom  increases  global  welfare  if  trade  costs  are  at  an 
intermediate level and 7 4 5 2 / / γ ≤ < . 
 
By setting  0 t =  in (58) we obtain 
       







∆ = − +           (62) 
Note that  i W ∆  given by (62) is greater than or equal to zero if  7 4 / γ ≥ .
48 Consequently, if 
7 4 / γ ≥ ,  i W ∆   is  positive  between  zero  and  the  upper  bound  for  t.  Thus,  parallel  trade 
freedom has a positive impact on global welfare if 7 4 5 2 / / γ ≤ <  [see Proposition 4]. 
However, let us now consider the case if 1 7 4 / γ < < . 
4.3.3.1.  Net Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on Global Welfare for  Intermediate Trade 
Costs and 1 7 4 / γ < <  
In this section, I will give an example in order to illustrate that the following proposition 
holds. 
 
Proposition 5: Parallel trade freedom can have negative welfare properties if trade costs are 
at an intermediate level and γ  is sufficiently low [1 7 4 / γ < < ]. 
 
                                                 
48  For  instance,  we  can  see  from  (62)  that 
2 7 11 4 0 − + = γ γ   if  7 4 / γ =   and  that 
2 7 4 11 + > γ γ   if 
7 4 / γ > . 
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We  already  know  from  the  previous  section  that  0 i W ∆ =   at  the  upper  bound 
( ) 1 2
_
t a / b = − γ . However, by looking at (58), it becomes apparent that  i W ∆  has another null 
at 







γ   = −  
 
            (63) 
as 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
7 5 7 7 11 7
2 2 2 0
72 36 2 2 9 4 2 72 18 2 2 18
i
a a a b a a a a a
W .
b b b b b b
      ∆ = + − − − − − − + =      
     
γ γ γ
γ γ γ   (64) 
Note that – in contrast to the previous sections – (63) is positive in this case as  7 4 / < γ . 
However, the following example illustrates that Proposition 5 holds. 
 
Example 1 
We set  100 a = , 1 2 b / =  and  13 8 / γ = . Figure 1 shows that  i W ∆  has one null at  25 t =  [see 
(63)] and the other null at  62 5 t . =  which is also the upper bound. Furthermore,  i W ∆  has its 
unique maximum at  43 75
max
i t . =  [see (60)] and the lower bound at  0 t = . 
 
Figure 1   Net Welfare Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom ( 100 a = , 1 2 b / =  and  13 8 / γ = ) 
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We can see from Figure 1 that  ( ) 0 0 25 i W t , ∆ < ∀ ∈  which suggests that Proposition 5 holds. 
The  intuition  behind  this  result  is  the  following.  As  I  have  shown  before,  parallel  trade 
freedom harms both the manufacturer as well as the distributor. Parallel trade freedom is also 
detrimental to consumers in country B because it leads to a higher retail price and a lower 
quantity sold in country B. Hence, consumers in country A are the only beneficiaries from 
parallel trade freedom. As long as  γ  is sufficiently high,  7 4 / ≤γ , the positive effect of 
parallel  trade  freedom  on  the  consumer  surplus  in  country  A  ceteris  paribus  more  than 
outweighs  the  sum  of  the  negative  effects  of  parallel  trade  freedom  on  the  profit  of  the 
manufacturer, the profit of the distributor and the consumer surplus in county B. If, however, 
country A and B are virtually homogeneous, 1 7 4 / γ < < , consumers in country A will benefit 
less from parallel trade freedom. In this case, the net effect of parallel trade freedom on global 
welfare will be negative if trade costs are at an intermediate level.     
 
4.4.  Net Effect of Parallel Trade on Global Welfare if Trade Costs are Low 
In this section, I shall show that the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 6: Parallel trade freedom increases global welfare if trade costs are low and γ  is 
sufficiently high ( 5 2 / γ > ). 
 
If trade costs are low,  t t
−
> , the effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare,  l W ∆ , is 
given by the difference between global welfare if parallel trade is permitted given by (57) and 
global welfare if the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade given by (55). 
Hence, 
     
2 2 2 2 2 67 5
288 18 18 18 9 72
* **
l l
a at bt a at a
W W W .
b b b
∆ = − = − − − − − +
γ γ γ
   (65) 
Note that  l W ∆  is a quadratic function of t. Moreover, recall that – as t is assumed to be 
positive –  γ  must be greater than 5/2. For smaller values of the parameter  γ  we would 
automatically end up in one of the other scenarios mentioned above. 
However, by differentiating (65) we obtain 
        0
18 9 9
l W a bt a
t
γ ∂∆
= − − − =
∂
 
30 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2008,  Paper 9
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2008/iss1/art9Frank Müller-Langer       Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Parallel Trade Freedom  31 








γ   ⇔ = − +  
 
.          (66) 
Note that 
max
l t  is the unique maximum as 
2 2 9 0 l W t b / ∂ ∆ ∂ = − <  as  0 b > . Furthermore, note 
that  0
max
l t <  as  0 a > ,  0 b >  and  0 γ > . 
However, by setting  0 t =  in (65) we obtain 
       







∆ = − − + .        (67) 
We  can  see  from  (67)  that  –  at  0 t =   –  0 l W ∆ >   if  5 2 / γ > .
49  Furthermore,  by  setting 
( ) 5 2 2
_
t t a ( / ) / b = = − γ  in (65) it follows that 







∆ = − +
γ
.          (68) 
Note that (68) is positive as  5 2 / γ > .
50 Consequently, taking into account that  l W ∆  is a 
quadratic function of t,  0
max
l t < ,  0 l W ∆ >  at  0 t = , and  0 l W ∆ >  at 
_ t , it is straightforward to 
see  that  l W ∆   is  positive  if  trade  costs  are  low  and  γ   sufficiently  high  ( 5 2 / γ > )  [see 
Proposition 6]. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
My model suggests that parallel imports in a double marginalization game with complete 
information will never occur in the sub-game perfect equilibrium, as it is always beneficial for 
the manufacturer to monopolize the market in country A at the third stage. However, the 
question arises as to how the manufacturer strategically chooses prices in order to prevent the 
occurrence of parallel trade. 
As I have shown, this depends on the level of the heterogeneity of the two countries in terms 
of market size – as measured by  γ  – and the trade costs t for given values for a and b. If 
t t
−
> , potential competition from parallel trade does not arise and thus the manufacturer will 
always charge the monopoly price in country A and the optimal wholesale price in country B. 
One tentative interpretation of this outcome is that parallel trade is a non-credible threat if 
parallel trade cost are high and the two countries are virtually homogeneous, i.e. if  1 γ → . If, 
                                                 
49 For instance, note that 
2 20 16 67 0 γ γ − − >  if  5 2 / γ > . 
50 For instance, note that  2 0 γ − >  if  5 2 / γ > . 
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however,  t t
−
≤ ,  potential  competition  from  parallel  trade  arises  and  the  manufacturer 
strategically sets the wholesale price in country B and the price in country A, in order to 
prevent that parallel trade occurs. 
Maskus  and  Ganslandt  (2002)  suggest  in  a  non-technical  article  on  parallel  trade  in 
pharmaceuticals  and  its  implications  for  low-income  countries  that,  under  plausible 
circumstances, parallel trade may increase prices in low-income countries and that smaller 
markets might end up not being served. 
Indeed, the analysis of my parallel trade model shows that this assertion is correct if trade 
costs are very low,  t t
−
< , and  γ  is sufficiently high, i.e.  5 2 / γ > . More specifically, I find 
that – for low trade costs – potential competition from parallel trade is so fierce that the 
manufacturer has to charge such a high wholesale price in the low-income country B in order 
to deter parallel trade that the distribution of the pharmaceutical product in country B becomes 
unprofitable. In this case, the market in county B will not be served.
51 Consequently, it would 
be desirable for country B to discourage parallel trade and to encourage price discrimination 
in order to open the otherwise unserved domestic market.
52 
As to the impact of parallel trade on the profit of the manufacturer, I come to the following 
conclusion. If parallel trade is permitted, the credible threat of parallel trade leads to lower 
profits of the manufacturer and thus reduces his incentives to invest in R&D [see Proposition 
2]. 
As to the welfare properties of parallel trade, parallel trade freedom increases global welfare if 
γ  is sufficiently high,  5 2 / γ >  [see Proposition 3 and Proposition 6]. If, however, trade 
costs are intermediate and γ  is sufficiently low, 1 7 4 / γ < < , parallel trade freedom can have 
negative welfare properties [see Proposition 5]. In this case, the negative effect of parallel 
trade freedom on the manufacturer, the distributor as well as on the consumers in country B 
more than outweighs the positive effect of parallel trade freedom on the consumers in country 
A. 
As  a  first  idea  for  further  research,  I  suggest  a  more  elaborate  theoretical  and  empirical 
analysis of the parameter t which is of significant importance for the results of my model. For 
instance, suppose that t is very low. In this case, country B is likely to end up not being served 
at  all  under  parallel  trade  freedom.  As  already  mentioned,  costs  of  re-packaging  and  re-
labelling  are incurred by  the parallel-importing distributor as well as  other parallel trade-
                                                 
51 For instance, see Table 1. See also Scherer and Watal (2002) on pp. 41 and Ganslandt et al. (2005) on p. 216. 
52 For instance, see Fink (2005) on p. 178. See also Varian (1985) and Maskus (2001) on p. 41. 
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specific transaction costs such as import duties on parallel trade. One may argue that the 
parameter  t  can  to  some  extent  be  influenced  by  the  manufacturer,  i.e.  through  special 
labelling, language, warnings etc. that make re-packaging and re-labelling more expensive for 
the parallel-importing distributor.
53 
Intuitively, on the one hand, the manufacturer may prefer to make parallel trade as costly as 
possible, in order to prevent parallel trade. Consider again the case of very low parallel trade 
costs where country B ends up not being served. In this case, it may be beneficial for the 
manufacturer to increase t so that he can sell his product in country B even under parallel 
trade freedom. 
On the other hand, to increase t through special labelling, language and warnings may also be 
costly for the manufacturer so that a trade-off arises between the costs of increasing t and the 
benefit from preventing parallel trade. 
As a second idea for further research, I suggest analyzing the strategic behaviour of foreign 
governments to protect consumers in their country from excessive pricing, i.e. through price 
caps or compulsory licensing. 
                                                 
53 For instance, see Maskus and Ganslandt (2002) on pp. 69. See also REMIT Consultants (1991) and Gallini and 
Hollis (1999) on pp. 2. 
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6.  Appendix 
Appendix 1: Proof with respect to the Non-negativity Restriction for the Equilibrium 
Wholesale Price in Country B 
 
In the following we show that for the non-negativity restriction for 
w*
B p  to be satisfied it is 
sufficient  that  the  non-negativity  restriction  for  3





γ ≤ − ,  is  satisfied.  Recall  that 









γ = + − ≥  





γ ⇔ ≤ + . 
Hence, the non-negativity restriction for 
w*
B p  is satisfied if the non-negativity restriction for 
3




γ γ + > −  and 1 2 > − . 
 
Appendix 2: Equilibrium Profits, Consumers Surplus and Global Welfare 
 
  Parallel  imports 
prohibited 
   
  Scenario 1-3 
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  Parallel  imports 
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In order to double-check that the results in the second and third column of the table are 
correct, note that the equilibrium profits and the levels of consumer surplus and welfare in 
country A and country B as well as global welfare in both situations with and without parallel 
imports are identical for the case that  ( ) 1 2 t a / b γ = −  which is the upper bound for t. 
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